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A thirteen-year-old boy sat in a room until a law-enforce-ment officer arrived. He asked the boy to follow himinto another room where three more adults, including
another law-enforcement officer, waited. The second law-
enforcement officer then proceeded to question the boy about
his involvement in a series of home robberies while the other
adults encouraged the boy to tell the truth. The boy then
implicated himself in the home robberies, acts for which he
was later arrested. He claimed that as the officers did not read
him his Miranda rights, his statement could not be used
against him.1 At first glance, it would appear his privilege
against self-incrimination had indeed been violated.2 It would
have been, except for one fact:  he was in school when the
police interrogated him.
Miranda v. Arizona responded to concerns over widespread
police coercion when interrogating suspects in custody. Taking
notice of the “menacing” psychological interrogation tactics
employed by law-enforcement officers in custodial interroga-
tions,3 the Supreme Court crafted the ubiquitous Miranda
warnings that devotees of procedural television “can recite . . .
in their sleep.”4 The Court noted that “[e]ven without employ-
ing brutality . . . the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts
a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness
of individuals,”5 and procedural safeguards are necessary to
prevent the “[subjugation of] the individual to the will of his
examiner.”6 The Court has thus far failed to mandate the pro-
vision of these crucial warnings to students during school-
house interrogations. But a recent case illustrates the impor-
tance of providing Miranda warnings to students.
This article will argue that interrogation by a law-enforce-
ment official—including school resource officers—in a school
setting is per se custodial interrogation and requires police to
give the Miranda warnings before questioning students.7 It
does not propose that all questioning of students that has pos-
sible criminal implications requires Miranda; questioning per-
formed by school officials in their administrative capacity does
not require the warnings.8 This article first reviews Miranda
requirements and the present approach of applying Miranda to
the school setting. Next, it reviews emerging doctrine on the
difference between juveniles and adults in the criminal justice
system. The article then argues that the growing phenomenon
of school resource officers as law enforcement and power
dynamics between school employees and students make
schools custodial in nature. Finally, it conducts a case study of
In re J.D.B.9 and concludes that denying Miranda rights to stu-
dents interrogated at school contradicts the purpose behind
Miranda. A per se custodial interrogation rule equitably
resolves these concerns.  
REFINING MIRANDA AND SCHOOLHOUSE 
APPLICATION
Almost immediately after deciding Miranda, the Court
noted clarification was required as to the new procedures,
specifically that of custodial interrogation. The Miranda Court
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1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”).
2. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself . . . .” US CONST. amend. V. 
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
4. Amos N. Guiora, Creating an Exception to an Exception—Too
Dangerous and Too Unwarranted, JURIST (Apr. 2, 2011),
http://jurist.org/forum/2011/04/creating-an-exception-to-an-
exception.php (Apr. 2, 2011); see also Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting the Miranda warnings “have
become part of our national culture”). 
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
6. Id. at 457–58 (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed
to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of
his free choice.”).
7. Throughout this article, “school” will refer to K-12 schools only.
As most of the students in K-12 will be under eighteen, juveniles
and students may be used interchangeably, but the proposed rule
will apply to all enrolled students regardless of age.
8. “A principal, acting alone and without invoking or outwardly ben-
efiting from the authority of any law enforcement officer may
question a student without complying with Miranda’s require-
ments. A student’s answers to such questions will be admissible at
subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings.” Paul Holland,
Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First
Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 40–41 (2006). For analy-
sis of the requirement of Miranda warnings when school adminis-
trators “act as law enforcement,” see generally id. This distinction
between law enforcement and school administrators acting pur-
suant to their administrative duties comports with New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (permitting reasonable warrant-
less school searches to maintain discipline and safety in schools).
9. 686 S.E.2d 135 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by
law-enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.”10 Oregon v. Mathiason11 provided the Court an
opportunity to clarify that definition. 
The officers in Mathiason, who suspected the defendant of
involvement in a home break-in, left a note at his house asking
to speak with him. “He came voluntarily to the police station,
where he was immediately informed that he was not under
arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview [he] did in fact
leave the police station without hindrance.”12 The Court also
rejected the assertion that “[s]uch a noncustodial situation is 
. . . converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because
. . . the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.’”13
Rejecting a per se custodial rule, the Court noted that “[a]ny
interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will
have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law-enforcement system which may
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime,” and
the mere fact the interrogation takes place in a police station
does not make a noncustodial interview into a custodial inter-
rogation.14 The Court later created a two-prong test to deter-
mine custody:  “[F]irst, what were the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation; and second, given those circum-
stances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”15 In apply-
ing Miranda to school settings, courts have relied on this objec-
tive custody test to justify declining to recognize school inter-
views as custodial interrogations.16
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that police
did not improperly fail to Mirandize a student before interro-
gating him at school about sexually abusing his three-year-old
sister.17 The investigator and principal met J.H. in the hallway
and escorted him to a conference room, “which the court esti-
mated would be about 30 feet by 50 feet,” at which time “[t]he
principal quickly left without saying anything.”18 The court
noted “J. was not restrained in any way. . . . Investigator Gerald
did not say anything ‘one way or another’ about whether J.
could leave, and ‘J.H. never asked if he could leave.’ Gerald did
not raise his voice. He made no threats or promises.”19 The
court declined to extend
Miranda rights, saying “Miranda
focused upon the pressure inher-
ent in the incommunicado inter-
rogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere,”
and that “we cannot conclude as
a matter of law that [J.] was in
custody when the police interro-
gated [him], i.e., that [his] freedom of action was curtailed to
a degree associated with a formal arrest.”20 Several other courts
determined interrogations at schools did not meet the objec-
tive Miranda custody test,21 including a recent case before the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently concluded
“a juvenile who made incriminating revelations to law-enforce-
ment officers . . . was not in custody when he incriminated
himself” during his questioning at school.22 J.D.B., a thirteen-
year-old special-education student, was interrogated by a
police officer in a school conference room about a rash of
recent thefts.23 Only after J.D.B. had incriminated himself did
the officer inform J.D.B. “that he did not have to speak with
him and that he was free to leave.”24 The North Carolina court
held “[t]he uniquely structured nature of the school environ-
ment inherently deprives students of some freedom of action.
However, the typical restrictions of the school setting apply to
all students and do not constitute a ‘significant’ deprivation of
freedom of action,” falling short of the custodial requirement
of Miranda.25 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on
another question26 and ultimately reversed and remanded on
that basis.27 This article, however, uses the case to argue that
given the particular vulnerability of juveniles in interrogatory
situations, schoolhouse interrogations by law enforcement sat-
isfy the custody prong of Miranda. 
THE EMERGING “JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT”
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has noted that “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,”28 and
indeed, recent cases indicate an evolving “juveniles are differ-
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
11. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 495.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (footnote omit-
ted).
16. See, e.g., In re J.H. 928 A.2d 643, 650–51 (D.C. 2007).
17. Id. at 650.
18. Id. at 646.
19. Id. at 647.
20. Id. at 651 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
21. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes “Custodial
Interrogation” Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring That
Suspect Be Informed of Federal Constitutional Rights Before
Custodial Interrogation—At School, 59 A.L.R. 6th 393 (2010).
22. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2394 (2011).
23. Id. at 136.
24. Id. at 137.
25. Id. at 138. “For a student in the school setting to be deemed in
custody, law enforcement must subject the student to ‘restraint on
freedom of movement’ that goes well beyond the limitations that
are characteristic of the school environment in general.” Id. (quot-
ing State v. Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (N.C. 2001)).
26. “Whether a trial court may consider a juvenile’s age in a Fifth
Amendment Miranda custody analysis in evaluating the totality of
the objective circumstances and determining whether a reasonable
person in the juvenile’s position would have felt he or she was free
to terminate police questioning and leave.” Brief for Petitioner at i,
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121). 
27. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406, 2408 (2011)
(holding that a child’s age should be included in the custody
analysis but not deciding whether J.D.B. was in custody).
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
The Court later
created a two-
prong test to
determine 
custody . . . .
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ent” jurisprudence. The
immaturity and impulsive-
ness of juveniles formed the
basis of the Court’s justifica-
tion for withholding certain
punishments from them. In
Roper v. Simmons, the Court
held the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the imposition of
capital punishment on defen-
dants who were under eighteen at the time of their crime.29
The Court observed “as the scientific and sociological studies
. . . tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often
than in adults and are more understandable among the young.
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.’”30 The Court additionally pointed to
state laws prohibiting “those under 18 years of age from vot-
ing, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent,”
as “recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsi-
bility of juveniles.”31 The Court later determined that life
without parole could not be imposed on juveniles for non-
homicide offenses in Graham v. Florida.32 “As compared to
adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility;’ they ‘are more vulnerable or sus-
ceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, includ-
ing peer pressure;’ and their characters are ‘not as well
formed.’”33 The same rationale underlying these decisions jus-
tifies treating juveniles in school as in custody for Miranda
purposes.34
Juvenile Susceptibility to Interrogation:  The Next Step in
“Kids are Different?”
The Court has declined to move from the standard volun-
tariness determination of Miranda waivers.35 But the impulsiv-
ity and irresponsibility of juveniles create a special concern in
interrogation situations. Research suggests that interrogation
techniques—such as those the Miranda Court used as justifi-
cation for crafting the warnings36—affect juveniles more than
adults.37 The risk of false confessions increases with juveniles
as “[t]hey think less strategically and more readily assume
responsibility for peers than do adults,”38 and “are more likely
to comply with authority figures and to tell police what they
think the police want to hear.”39 In one study,
[S]ubjects took part in a reaction time task using a
computer keyboard. They were then accused of pressing
a prohibited key on the keyboard, causing the computer
to crash. Half the subjects were then presented with false
evidence in the form of a bogus computer printout
showing that they had pressed a key they were warned
not to touch. All subjects were innocent, and all were
prompted to sign a confession.40
The study emphasized the special vulnerability of juveniles,
finding alarmingly high rates of false confessions:  78 percent
in twelve- to thirteen-year-olds, 72 percent for fifteen- to six-
teen-year-olds, and 59 percent in eighteen- to twenty-six-year-
olds.41 Although courts may consider age in determining
whether a person voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights,
the Supreme Court previously declined to mandate considera-
tion of the suspect’s age in the custody determination.42 In
spite of this refusal, age is not wholly irrelevant in custody
analysis. The demographic most likely to falsely confess
includes school-age students like J.D.B., and yet courts have
been unwilling to afford them Miranda protections in the one
place they spend the most time. 
The State of North Carolina and its amici in J.D.B. assert the
petitioner’s standard would make age a proxy for location and
29. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
30. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).
31. Id.
32. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Petitions have already been filed in the
Supreme Court to extend the ban on juvenile life without parole
to homicide crimes. Adam Liptak & Lisa Faye Petak, Juvenile
Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, at
A13.
33. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
34. See generally In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 142 (N.C. 2009) (Brady,
J., dissenting) (“The rationale behind these laws is practical and
just. The perceptions, cognitive abilities, and moral development
of juveniles are different from those of adults; thus, the law rightly
takes this into account when dealing with juvenile offenders.”).
35. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“We discern no per-
suasive reasons why any other approach is required where the
question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed
to whether an adult has done so.”).
36. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449–54 (1966) (describing
common psychological interrogation techniques).
37. “[I]nterrogation techniques designed to manipulate adults may be
even more effective and thus problematic when used against chil-
dren. Tactics like aggressive questioning, presenting false evi-
dence, and leading questions may create unique dangers when
employed with youths.” Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of
Juveniles:  An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 219, 244–46 (2006).
38. Id. at 244; see also Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n and the Am. Acad.
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae In Support of
Neither Party at 2, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No.
08-7412) (“Adolescents are also more emotionally volatile and
susceptible to stress and peer influences.”).
39. Feld, supra note 37, at 246.
40. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of
Confessions:  A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI.
IN THE PUB. INT. 33, 52 (2004).
41. Id. at 53. The missing data for fourteen- and seventeen-year-olds
is presumably an error.
42. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004) (holding in fed-
eral habeas case age was not a proper consideration in custody
determination). But see id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“There may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to
the “custody” inquiry under [Miranda].”). The Yarborough major-
ity opinion seemingly precludes the success of J.D.B. as presented
to the Supreme Court. See supra note 26. However, it does not
impact a decision finding school interrogations are per se custo-
dial.
[T]he impulsivity
and irresponsibility
of juveniles creates
a special concern
in interrogation 
situations.
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make the objective custody test too subjective.43 Refocusing on
the location of the interrogation—school—rather than the age
of the suspect removes this concern. Instead of a juvenile being
in custody because he or she is young, he or she is in custody
because he or she is in school—“an objective circumstance
that is readily observable by officers.”44 The age of the suspect
simply serves to provide a basis of understanding why he or
she may not feel able to terminate the interrogation in school,45
and it justifies the creation of a bright-line rule regarding
schoolhouse interrogations. 
The denial of Miranda rights to students in school hinges on
the objective custody determination:  was the suspect
“deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way?”46
The North Carolina Attorney General flatly dismissed the
assertion that students were in custody for Miranda purposes
during school hours, claiming “the school setting itself is a
familiar one to a student. In that respect, it is less inherently
coercive than a police station.”47 As J.D.B. illustrates, this line
of thought ignores the reality that schools are increasingly pop-
ulated with law-enforcement officials, creating an atmosphere
reminiscent of the Miranda Court’s “incommunicado interro-
gation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.”48
NONCUSTODIAL CUSTODY?:  SCHOOL 
INTERROGATIONS AS CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 
Officer Krupke Roaming the Halls:49 The Increasing
Presence of Law Enforcement in Schools
Concerns over school safety have steadily increased since
the mid-nineties due to highly publicized school shootings
and other violence.50 One response to parental and lawmaker
concern has been the presence
of school resource officers
(SROs) in the educational set-
ting. The Center for the
Prevention of School Violence
defines an SRO as “a certified
law-enforcement officer who
is permanently assigned to
provide coverage to a school
or a set of schools. The SRO is
specifically trained to perform
three roles:  law-enforcement
officer; law-related counselor;
and law-related education
teacher.”51 Although no national numbers regarding SROs
exist, the trend increases yearly.52 “[I]n 2004, 60 percent of
high school teachers reported armed police officers stationed
on school grounds, and in 2005, almost 70 percent of public
school students ages 12 to 18 reported that police officers or
security guards patrol their hallways.”53 In 2009, it was esti-
mated that 20,000 law-enforcement officers patrolled
schools.54 As “‘[l]aw enforcement officer’ means a sworn law-
enforcement officer with the power to arrest,”55 SROs have the
ability to arrest children at school and have increasingly done
so,56 disproportionately affecting poor, minority, and special-
needs students.57 Some research has suggested the presence of
SROs itself criminalizes student behavior, as “discipline prob-
lems traditionally handled by school principals and teachers
now are more likely handled by a school police officer [e.g.,]
a scuffle between students becomes assault or disrupting class
43. See Brief for the Respondent at 25–28, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121) [hereinafter Respondent’s
Brief]; see also Brief of the Nat’l District Attorneys Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9–14, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121) [hereinafter NDAA Brief];
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 32, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)
(No. 09-11121) [hereinafter United States Brief].
44. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 35.
45. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“[T]he only relevant inquiry
is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have
understood his situation.”).
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
47. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43 at 36–37 (citations omitted).
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
49. See WEST SIDE STORY (Mirisch Corp. 1961).
50. Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the
Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 280, 280
(2009). 
51. Ctr. for the Prevention of Sch. Violence, School Resource Officer,
http://www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/school_resource_officer.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-101 (2006)
(“‘School resource officer’ means a certified law-enforcement offi-
cer hired by the local law-enforcement agency to provide law-
enforcement and security services to Virginia public elementary
and secondary schools.”).
52. Theriot, supra note 50, at 281 (noting the number of SRO pro-
grams have “swelled since the late 1990s,” and “represent a sig-
nificant and popular trend in school violence prevention”).
53. Catherine Y. Kim & I. India Geronimo, Policing in Schools:
Developing a Governance Document for School Resource Officers in
K-12 Schools at 5, ACLU WHITE PAPER (Aug. 2009) (footnotes
omitted), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/racial
justice/whitepaper_policinginschools.pdf.
54. Theriot, supra note 50, at 281.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391.1(b)(6) (2009). 
56. Kim & Geronimo, supra note 53, at 8 (“The number of children
arrested or referred to court for school discipline has grown in
recent years.”). 
57. Id. at 9. (“Children of color and students with disabilities are dis-
proportionately represented among these students [referred to
courts by schools]. In Florida, Black youth, who represented only
22 percent of the overall juvenile population, accounted for 47
percent of all school-based delinquency referrals; youth with spe-
cial needs accounted for 23 percent of all school-based referrals.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Peter Price, When Is a Police Officer
an Officer of the Law?:  The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 542 (2009) (“[The school-to-prison
pipeline] has had a disproportionate impact on poor and minority
communities and has dramatically increased the number of juve-
niles that pass through the criminal justice system. Ironically, this
increase has occurred at the same time that overall and juvenile
crime rates have declined. A critical component of the pipeline is
the role of police officers in the public schools.” (footnotes omit-
ted)).
“The SRO 
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becomes disorderly conduct.”58
Additionally, SROs’ efficiency
controlling crime is question-
able—most violent crimes by
juveniles occur after school
hours and outside of school.59
Regardless of SROs’ effect on
the school violence rate, their
presence in hallways impacts
students’ feelings of confine-
ment and Miranda custodial
analysis.
Teachers Command, and Students Obey:  Power Dynamics
and Custody
The presence of SROs intensifies the inherent power struc-
ture of schools by reinforcing students’ low rank in school
hierarchy.60 In addition to the principal, teachers, and other
school administrators, students must now rank themselves
against SROs, who carry the force of the criminal law with
them.61 Merely by virtue of holding a social position within the
school, children legitimatize the authority’s orders within the
school.62 In determining whether to defer to authority figures,
children “consider the location of the event and whether it is
within the jurisdiction of the authority. In addition, they view
legitimacy with respect to the type of directive issued by the
authority.”63 By giving SROs a place within the school social
system, administrators are legitimatizing SRO authority in stu-
dents’ eyes. Although it is important for SROs to have author-
ity and the support of school administrators to perform their
duties—SROs could hardly be expected to do a good job if the
school undermines their authority—school support for SROs
and outside law enforcement impacts students’ ability to exer-
cise their rights in an interrogation. The unique nature of
school settings only increases the pressure to cooperate with
school administrators and law enforcement, including outside
law enforcement unaffiliated with the school, “to avoid pro-
voking conflict.”64
As courts have observed, “[p]ublic schools have a relation-
ship with their students that is markedly different from the
relationship between most governmental agencies . . . and the
children with whom they deal.”65 Even though the U.S.
Supreme Court has held students do not “shed their constitu-
tional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”66 the rights students
enjoy in school have been sharply curtailed.67 If a student
believes the officer has the support of the highest authority in
the school, the student will be unlikely to believe that he or she
has a choice in whether to speak with the officer without
incurring disciplinary measures.68 “Through the legal doctrine
of in loco parentis, courts upheld the right of schools to disci-
pline students, to enforce rules, and to maintain order.”69 The
power dynamics between school authorities and cooperating
law enforcement all impact the custody analysis by forming the
“circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”70
Follow Me Please:  A Case Study of In Re J.D.B.
The North Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding J.D.B.
was not in custody and was therefore not entitled to Miranda
58. Theriot supra note 50, at 280.
59. OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book—Time of Day, OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/offenders/qa03301.asp?qaDate=20
08 (“Juvenile violence peaks in the afterschool hours on school
days and in the evenings on nonschool days. On nonschool days,
the incidence of juvenile violence increases through the afternoon
and early evening hours, peaking between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.”);
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book—Comparing Adult and Juvenile
Offenders, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/
offenders/qa03401.asp?qaDate=2008 (“Nearly one-third (29%) of
all violent crime committed by juvenile offenders occurs between
3 p.m. and 7 p.m.”).
60. Marta Laupa & Elliot Turiel, Children’s Concepts of Authority and
Social Contexts, 85 J. OF EDUC. PSYCHOL. 191, 191 (1993) (“In par-
ticular, it has been found that children view an authority, such as
a teacher, as a member of a social system, that of the school in the
case of a teacher.”).
61. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
62. Laupa & Turiel, supra note 60, at 191. (“[C]hildren judge that
holding a social position in that system is one attribute that legit-
imizes a teacher’s directives within the social context of the
school”).
63. Id. at 196.
64. Feld, supra note 37, at 230 (“Social expectations of obedience to
authority and children’s lower social status make them more vul-
nerable than adults during interrogation. Less powerful people,
such as juveniles or racial minorities, often speak indirectly with
authority figures . . . . Miranda requires suspects to invoke their
rights clearly and unambiguously, a requirement that runs con-
trary to most juvenile delinquents’ social responses and verbal
styles.”).
65. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 607 (2d Cir. 1999).
66. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
67. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (“[S]chools
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug
use . . . .”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)
(“[S]chools do[] not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the sub-
ject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the rea-
sonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”). Some
Supreme Court justices would go further in curtailing students’
rights at school. E.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 412–13 (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
68. See Brief of Juvenile Law Ctr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 21, J.D.B. v. State of North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394
(2011) (No. 09-11121) [hereinafter JLC Brief] (“In school settings
particularly, students may place greater weight on the authority of
the adults they encounter . . . [and are] likely to place greater
weight on the authority of police officers in the company of
school authority figures.”). 
69. Morse, 551 U.S. at 412–13 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Teachers
commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on
the power of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to main-
tain order.”).
70. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
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warnings prior to his interrogation by a juvenile investigator.71
When considered in conjunction with juveniles’ susceptibility
to interrogation, the school environment is sufficiently coercive
that it warrants a per se rule requiring Miranda warnings before
school interrogations. “A middle school is a restrictive environ-
ment. . . . [M]iddle school students are not free to leave the
campus without permission, and visitors to the school, includ-
ing parents and guardians of students, must upon arrival report
their presence and receive permission to be at the facility.”72
Moreover, the cases cited by opponents of Mirandizing students
do not support their argument. The State misapplies U.S.
Supreme Court precedent and subjects students to the very
dangers the Miranda Court enacted precautions to prevent.
In J.D.B., an SRO went into J.D.B.’s classroom and escorted
him to a conference room where the assistant principal, his
intern, and a juvenile investigator from the local police depart-
ment waited.73 The investigator proceeded to interrogate J.D.B.
about home break-ins while the assistant principal urged J.D.B
“to ‘do the right thing’ and tell the truth.”74 The court denied
J.D.B. was in custody as no one locked the door or restrained
the student, and stated:  “For a student in the school setting to
be deemed in custody, law enforcement must subject the stu-
dent to restraint on freedom of movement that goes well
beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school
environment in general.”75 The court also denied that the
school resource officer’s presence “render[ed] that questioning
custodial in nature.”76
North Carolina argued before the Supreme Court that the
mere fact that students must attend school does not create cus-
tody.77 However, the attendance issue sufficiently distinguishes
school interrogations from the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited
in support. North Carolina cited Oregon v. Mathiason for the
proposition “that a non-custodial setting is not converted to a
custodial one simply because a reviewing court concludes that,
even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement, the questioning took place in a coercive environ-
ment like a police station.”78 But this misapplies the facts in
Mathiason. The Court in Mathiason placed great emphasis on
the fact that the defendant “came voluntarily to the police sta-
tion, where he was immediately informed that he was not under
arrest. . . . It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in
custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any sig-
nificant way.”79 Mathiason had a
choice in going to the police sta-
tion that students do not have in
attending school:  “[t]he penal-
ties for failure to attend school
can be severe:  a youth can be
detained, declared a ward of the
court, or have criminal liability
and even jail time imposed on
his or her parents.”80
Assuming arguendo that
J.D.B.’s mere presence in school did not render him in custody,
his removal to the conference room surely did. J.D.B. was
removed from his classroom by a certified law-enforcement offi-
cer and escorted to a room containing another law-enforcement
officer and two school administrators, whom the student is
socialized to obey.81 As Justice Kagan noted in oral argument:
“Do we need either imaginative powers or empirical data to
know that when a 13-year-old is brought into a room in his
school, taken out of class, four people are there, two are police
officers, one is assistant principal, threatened with custody, that
that person is not going to feel free to take off and leave?”82
“The only logical reason for [the SRO] to escort J.D.B. was to
restrain his freedom of movement; J.D.B. had no choice but to
comply with his removal from the classroom. . . . Therefore,
J.D.B.’s freedom of movement was restricted from the moment
he was removed from his classroom . . . .”83 Although “the
school setting itself is a familiar one to a student,”84 adminis-
trative conference rooms likely are not.  
Adopting this line of reasoning would severely prejudice stu-
dents’ rights by implying schools are “safe zones” for police
interrogations. If being taken out of class by an uniformed offi-
cer and held in a room by the authority figures of the school
and outside law enforcement is not “‘restraint on freedom of
movement’ that goes well beyond the limitations that are char-
acteristic of the school environment in general,”85 it seems
unlikely any questioning in schools could ever be considered
custodial interrogation under Miranda. Indeed, this appears to
be the position Justice Scalia took in oral argument:  because
71. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2394 (2011).
72. Id. at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 138–39 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 144 (Brady, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 138 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 139.
77. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 36 (“Even if this Court were
to consider the setting in which the statements in this case were
made, the questioning of petitioner by law enforcement officers in
a school setting did not make the interview custodial.”); see also
United States Brief, supra note 43, at 33 (“The Court has, for
example, held that the far more restrictive environment of incar-
ceration to serve a sentence in a prison does not automatically
constitute ‘custody’ for Miranda purposes, although additional
restraints in a prison interview may amount to ‘custody.’”).
78. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 36 (citing Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam)).
79. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
80. JLC Brief, supra note 64, at 15–16. 
81. Laupa & Turiel, supra note 60, at 196 (“[T]he principal is gener-
ally seen by children as the highest authority in the school.”).
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.
Ct. 2394 (2011) (09-11121), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-11121.pdf
[hereinafter Oral Argument]; see also In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135,
143–44 (Brady, J., dissenting) (N.C. 2009) (“That a special inves-
tigator from the police department . . . was making a special trip
to the school would alert any reasonable middle school student
that something serious was taking place . . . .”).
83. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 143–44 (Brady, J., dissenting).
84. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43, at 36–37.
85. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting State v. Buchanan, 543
S.E.2d 823, 827 (N.C. 2001)). 
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86. Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 33 (statement of J. Scalia).
87. See id. at 33 (statement of J. Ginsburg) (“This seventh grader was
marched by the school security officer, taken away from his peers,
from his class in—put in a room with a closed door with the assis-
tant principal. That is not a normal part of the school day. That’s
not where he is required to be.”).
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 466 (“Without the protections flowing from adequate
warning and the rights of counsel, ‘all the careful safeguards
erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or
any other witness, would become empty formalities in a proce-
dure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a con-
fession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised
pleasure of the police.’” (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
91. Id. at 449–50; see also In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 143 (N.C.
2009) (Brady, J., dissenting), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (“Law
enforcement in the instant case took advantage of the middle
school’s restrictive environment and its psychological effect by
choosing to interrogate J.D.B. there, instead of at his home or in
any other public, more neutral location.”).
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
93. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (“[W]e have
held that the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings, and that the rights of students must be applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment.”) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
94. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 147 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
school environment, where juveniles are faced with a variety of
negative consequences—including potential criminal charges—for
refusing to comply with the requests or commands of authority fig-
ures, the circumstances are inherently more coercive and require
more, not less, careful protection of the rights of the juvenile.”). 
students are required to attend
school and obey teacher direc-
tives, students are never in cus-
tody. He stated:  
[T]he additional coer-
cive effect of not being able
to leave [the conference
room] probably didn’t make
a whole lot of difference. He
knew he was stuck where
his parents had put him, in
the school. And if the
school sent him to a class-
room, he had to be in the classroom; and if the school
sent him to a place where he could, if he wished, volun-
tarily speak to the police officers, he had to be there.86
This assertion is absurd. There is certainly a difference
between being required to be in a classroom learning and being
required to accompany a uniformed police officer to go speak
with the assistant principal and another law-enforcement offi-
cer. One is an everyday occurrence; the other presumably is
not.87 The court’s determination that J.D.B. was not in custody,
and was therefore not entitled to notice of his rights, ignores
the reality of schools’ restrictive nature, the relationships
between officials and students, and the interrogation in ques-
tion. Moreover, the denial of Miranda rights to students inter-
rogated by police at school contradicts the very purpose of the
Miranda warnings.
Upholding the Very Danger Miranda Sought To Prevent
The removal of a suspect from familiar surroundings (class-
rooms) and forcing him “into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
[running him] through menacing police interrogation proce-
dures” is the exact kind of psychological coercion that the
Miranda warnings were designed to thwart.88 At no time did
any of the four adults in J.D.B.’s case “undertake to afford
appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to
insure that the statements were truly the product of free
choice.”89 The withholding from students of knowledge about
the right not to incriminate themselves forces them to become
complicit in their own prosecutions.90
Additionally, the choice to interrogate in school rather than
at home, especially in offenses occurring off school grounds,
demonstrates the same kind of psychological manipulation the
Miranda Court warned against:  “The subject should be
deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home he
may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly
aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions
of criminal behavior within the walls of his home.”91 Placing a
student in a situation where he or she has no advocate, indeed
cannot secure one due to his or her lack of knowledge of the
right to have one, isolates him or her. In fact, the Court noted
isolation was the key feature of coercive interrogations:  “To be
alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to
deprive him of any outside support.”92 To prevent the wholesale
dismantling of students’ Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, there must be a per se rule of custodial inter-
rogation and Miranda warnings. 
No Miranda-Free Zones:  Justifications for a Per Se
Miranda Rule in Schools
The recognition of required Miranda warnings when stu-
dents are interrogated by law enforcement in school protects
students’ rights and provides a bright-line rule for school offi-
cials and law enforcement. Moreover, by limiting it to the
school setting, it does not unduly burden law enforcement.
Logic dictates that if courts take the special nature of the school
environment into account in order to restrict some constitu-
tional rights,93 then courts should also take the school environ-
ment into account to strengthen other constitutional rights. 
The susceptibility of juveniles to police interrogation tech-
niques and the inherent power structure of schools require
Miranda warnings to ensure police do not take advantage of
students’ deference to authority.94 If school interrogation is not
per se custodial, then schools risk becoming a free zone for
officers to interrogate students. Armed with the knowledge
Miranda cannot enter the school, police would choose to speak
to students in schools to avoid warning students of their rights
and risking possible interference by parents or other advo-
[T]he choice to
interrogate in
school . . .
demonstrates the
same kind of 
psychological
manipulation the
Miranda Court
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95. For example in Greene v. Camreta, a social worker chose to ques-
tion an elementary school student, allegedly sexually abused, at
school “because it is a place where children feel safe and would
allow him ‘to conduct the interview away from the potential influ-
ence of suspects, including parents.’” 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated as moot by 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
96. In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 143 (Brady, J., dissenting).
97. Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 38 (statement of J. Breyer)
(“Now, what happens to destroy the criminal justice system? You
can see from my overstatement, I tend to suspect nothing, but you
tell me.”). 
98. Id. (statement of N.C. Att’y Gen. Roy Cooper).
99. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
100. See generally Respondent’s Brief, supra note 43. See also
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004) (“The Miranda
custody inquiry is an objective test. . . . The objective test fur-
thers ‘the clarity of [Miranda’s] rule,’ ensuring that the police do
not need ‘to make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue
before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect.’” (quoting
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted))).
101. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (holding there is
a “public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warn-
ings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into
evidence”).
102. Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police
Executives Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 925 (2007).
103. See generally Shields, supra note 21.
104. Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 24–25 (statement of Barbara S.
Blackman, Attorney of Record for the Petitioner). 
105. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“This was the
spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the man-
ner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be
enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary
. . . to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had
not become but a ‘form of words’ . . . in the hands of government
officials.” (internal citation omitted)).
cates.95 “It is troubling that . . . a public middle school, which
should be an environment where children feel safe and pro-
tected, [could become] a place where a law-enforcement inves-
tigator claim[s] a tactical advantage over a juvenile.”96
Recognizing a right to receive Miranda warnings from law
enforcement before school interrogations would protect stu-
dents’ rights and would not come at the expense of law-
enforcement goals nor needlessly restrict school administra-
tors’ abilities to enforce school rules. 
Mirandizing students will not “destroy the criminal justice
system.”97 North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper
asserted in oral argument that “under [J.D.B.’s] theory, a school
resource officer who is going to take a juvenile into a room to
talk about a stolen cell phone or bullying, the first thing that
he’s got to say is you have the right to remain silent. Now, that,
in my opinion, disrupts the communication.”98 However the
Court has previously noted: 
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive
if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on
the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their
constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should
have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult
with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise,
these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
then there is something very wrong with that system.99
Police should not be able to claim students should not
know of their rights because they may choose to invoke them.
The limitation of this per se rule to school settings would also
prevent subjective factors from entering into the objective cus-
tody determination.
The main concern over extending the Miranda custody rule
to consider age is that it would completely dismantle Miranda’s
objective custody determination.100 By linking the determina-
tion to location instead of age, this fear is unfounded. The stan-
dard is completely objective:  the student is either in school or
not. It would not create a “Miranda minor” rule, mandating
different warnings for all K-12 students in all situations.
Students in school would receive the standard Miranda warn-
ings, the standard for determining voluntariness of any waiver
would remain the same, and a public safety exception could be
read into this rule as it has been in Miranda.101 A per se custo-
dial interrogation rule for schools will balance law enforce-
ment needs without sacrificing notice to students of their con-
stitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The purpose behind Miranda was to provide clear guidance
to law-enforcement officers as to procedure to ensure people
could make informed decisions before waiving their rights.
Unfortunately, “police have complied more with the letter than
with the spirit of Miranda.”102 As the J.D.B. case and others like
it illustrate,103 law-enforcement officers engage in psychologi-
cally intimidating interrogation without taking the small step of
informing students of their right not to incriminate themselves.
“[W]e can’t simply say ‘we’re not going to do anything. We are
not going to tell these children that they don’t have to cooperate
with the State in building a case against themselves.’”104 The
time has come for the recognition of a per se custodial interro-
gation rule when students are questioned by law enforcement at
school. Failing to do so would give law-enforcement officers
carte blanche to question students at school. The special nature
of schools creates the intimidating atmosphere that so con-
cerned the Miranda court. There must be a bright-line rule to
prevent students’ privilege against self-incrimination from
becoming a right in name only.105
Stephanie Forbes graduated from the
William & Mary School of Law in 2011, and
she won the American Judges Association's
writing competition for law students with
this article. She presently serves as a law
clerk to the Honorable Jane Grall of the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Forbes received her undergraduate degree in
2008 from Mount Holyoke College. She thanks Professor Paul
Marcus and her parents for all their support.
Court Review - Volume 47 75
